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Abstract
This paper constructs a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with pollution generated by
the tourism industry. The national government issues emission permits and constructs the public infrastructure
that has no congestion effect. A stricter environmental regulation, by reducing the amount of emission permits,
unambiguously improves the tourism terms-of-trade. If the positive terms-of-trade effect is sufficiently large,
stricter environmental regulation expands tourism sector. Domestic wage inequality narrows or widens, de-
pending on the elasticity of substitution in each industry.
Keywords: Tourism, Pure public intermediate good, Environmental regulation, Tourism terms-of-trade, Wage
inequality
1 Introduction
The number of tourists is steadily growing in the world. According to UNWTO (2019), international tourist
arrivals reached 1.4 billion in 2018. However, the growing number of tourists poses a threat to the environment
of the destination country. For example, concentration of people degrades the water quality of local community,
and traffic congestion pollutes the air by emitting fumes. In order to mitigate these negative effects, a national
government introduces environmental regulation by issuing emission permits and controlling the amount of
pollution. At the same time, the tourism industry requires a large amount of infrastructure, such as, park, airport,
highway, and water supply, which is rather difficult to be financed by only private fund. The government can
∗I am grateful to Hisayuki Okamoto for helpful comments and suggestion. All remaining errors are mine.
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use the revenue from selling pollution permits to construct the infrastructure. Some infrastructures include
congestion effect, in which an increase in users lowers the efficiency. This paper considers an infrastructure
with no congestion effect. That is, the public infrastructure in this paper is the creation of atmosphere type in
the terminology of Meade (1952), or pure public intermediate good. Shimizu and Okamoto (2020) develops a
model of polluted small open economy with tourism infrastructure that contributes to only tourism industry
and has no congestion effect.1 However, some infrastructures, such as wireless network, highway, or airport,
contribute to many industries as well as tourism industry. Therefore, we develop a small open economy model
where tourism industry emits pollution and the government constructs a public infrastructure that contributes
all the industry in the economy. We then examine the effects of stricter environmental regulation on production,
income inequality, and welfare. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Then in section 3 we analyze the effect of stricter environmental regulation, taking the tourism terms-of-trade as
given. In section 4, we examine the total effects of stricter environmental regulation, considering the change in
the tourism terms-of-trade. Concluding remarks are made in section 5.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy. The home country consists of two private sectors and one public sector. The
two private sectors are manufacturing (or traded good) sector and service sector. The public sector produces
non-traded public infrastructure that enhances the productivity of both private sectors. The manufacturing
good is traded while the tourism service is non-traded in the absence of foreign tourists. The service is exported
through international tourism and thus manufacturing good is imported. We will call service T as tourism
service and its price as the tourism terms-of-trade. The manufacturing sector employs skilled labor S and capital
K to produce manufacturing good. The production of tourism service requires unskilled labor L and pollution
permits Z. The public sector constructs public infrastructure using only capital input. The national government
finances the cost of public infrastructure by taxing the income of domestic residents.
1Yanase (2015) considers the same type of tourism infrastructure.
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The production functions satisfy the properties of quasi concavity and linear homogeneity.2
X  gX(M)F(S, KX),
T  gT(M)N(L, Z),
where the functions F(·) and N(·) exhibit constant returns to scale and quasi-concave. M is the amount of public
infrastructure. The above two equations imply that public infrastructure enhances the productivity of both
industries. The contribution of infrastructure to the productivity of each industry is expressed by the function
g j . We assume g j is twice continuously differentiable and has the following properties:
g j(0)  1, g′j > 0, g′′j < 0, limM→0 g
′
j(M)  ∞, limM→∞ g
′
j(M)  0 (1)
The first condition implies that if there is no public infrastructure, productivity of each industry does not
change. The second and third conditions state that public infrastructure has positive and diminishing effect on
the productivity of each industry. Finally, the last two conditions are known as the Inada conditions. Similar
assumption is made in Yanase (2015).
The public infrastructure is produced by only capital input:
M  KM/aKM , (2)
where ai j is the amount of factor i to produce one unit of good j. We assume linear production function for
public infrastructure, and thus aKM is constant.
We now turn to describe the equilibrium conditions for the supply side of the economy. Assume that perfect
competitionprevails inmanufacturing and tourism industries. The zero profit condition for tradedgood industry
is given by
aSXwS + aKXq  pX , (3)
where pX is the price of traded good, wS the wage of skilled labor, and q the rental rate of capital. Note that pX
is constant by the assumption of a small open economy.
2Pi and Zhou (2014) considers more specified functional form that describes the positive externality of public infrastructure and assumes
the public infrastructure improves uniformly the productivity of each industry (gX  gT  Mξ , 0 < ξ < 1 in our notation). Instead, following
Okamoto (1985), we consider more general case where public infrastructure has different effects on both industries.
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The zero profit condition for tourism service industry is given by
aLTwL + aZT r  pT , (4)
where pT is the price of tourism service, wL the wage of unskilled labor, r the price of emission permits.
The zero profit condition for tourism infrastructure industry is3
aKMq  pM , (5)
where pM is the shadow price of public infrastructure.
The full employment condition of capital is
aKXX + aKMM  K. (6)
The demand-supply equality of skilled labor requires
aSXX  S. (7)
The equilibrium of unskilled labor market is given by
aLTT  L. (8)
The amount of pollution permits is
aZTT  Z. (9)
According to Lindahl pricing, the price of public infrastructure is determined by the sum of marginal value
products of public infrastructure in both industries: pM  pX ∂X∂M + pT
∂T
∂M . Thus we have
pMM  ξX(M)pXX + ξT(M)pTT, (10)
where ξ j 
dj
dM
M
j 
dg j
dM
M
g j
, ( j  X, T) denote productivity improvement rate of industry j by additional public
infrastructure. Pi and Zhou (2014) considers the symmetry case of ξX  ξT .
The national government finances the cost of public infrastructure by taxing income of domestic residents.
Then budget constraint of national government satisfies
t(wLL + wSS + qK + rZ)  pMM, (11)
3Since cost minimization is required in public sector, cost equals revenue.
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where t is income tax rate.4
Given pT , (3) - (10) determine X, T,M, wS, wL, q, r and pM .5 Then, t is determined by (11).
3 Comparative statics: supply side analysis
The supply side of the economy ((3) - (10)) determines outputs and factor prices (and therefore factor demands).
In this section, we examine the effects of a stricter environmental regulation and an improvement in the tourism
terms-of-trade pT . A stricter environmental regulation means a reduction in emission permits (dZ < 0).
The cost minimization in each industry requires
θSX aˆSX + θKX aˆKX  − gˆX , (12)
θLT aˆLT + θZT aˆZT  − gˆT . (13)
To facilitate the following analysis, we define the elasticity of substitution in each sector,
σX 
aˆKX − aˆSX
wˆS − qˆ , (14)
σT 
aˆZT − aˆLT
wˆL − rˆ . (15)
Solving (12) and (14) for aiX , we have
aˆSX  −θKXσX(wˆS − qˆ) − gˆX , (16)
aˆKX  θSXσX(wˆS − qˆ) − gˆX . (17)
Solving (13) and (15) for aiT , we obtain
4(11) is rewritten as
t 
qKM
wLL + wSS + qK + rZ
,
where we have used (2) and (5). Then the national income is given by
R  (1 − t)(wLL + wSS + qK + rZ)  wLL + wSS + qKX + rZ  pXX + pTT,
where (3) and (4) is used.
5The price of tourism service pT is to be determined by demand and supply of domestic tourism service. See section 4.
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aˆLT  −θZTσT(wˆL − rˆ) − gˆT , (18)
aˆZT  θLTσT(wˆL − rˆ) − gˆT . (19)
Differentiatitng (3) and considering (12), we obtain
θSX wˆS + θKX qˆ − ξXMˆ  pˆX . (20)
Differentiating (4) and taking into account (13), we have
θLT wˆL + θZT rˆ − ξTMˆ  pˆT . (21)
Since aKM is constant, (5) implies
qˆ  pˆM . (22)
Differentiating (6) and considering (17), we obtain
λKXXˆ + λKXθSXσX(wˆS − qˆ) + (λKM − λKXξX)Mˆ  Kˆ. (23)
Differentiating (7) and taking into account (16), we have
−θKXσX(wˆS − qˆ) − ξXMˆ + Xˆ  Sˆ. (24)
Differentiating (8) and substituting (18), we have
−θZTσT(wˆL − rˆ) − ξTMˆ + Tˆ  Lˆ. (25)
Differentiating (9) and considering (19), we have
θLTσT(wˆL − rˆ) − ξTMˆ + Tˆ  Zˆ. (26)
Differentiating (10), we have
pˆM + Mˆ  δX(pˆX + Xˆ) + δT(pˆT + Tˆ) + δX ξˆX + δT ξˆT ,
where δX ≡ ξXpXX/pMM and δT ≡ ξTpTT/pMM. Define  j  Mξ j
dξ j
dM . Taking into account (22), we have
qˆ + τMˆ − δXXˆ − δT Tˆ  δX pˆX + δT pˆT , (27)
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where τ ≡ 1− δXX − δTT  δX + δT − δXX − δTT  δX(1− X)+ δT(1− T) > 0 since 1−  j  ξ j − g′′j M/g′j > 0.6
From (25) and (26), we have7
σT(wˆL − rˆ)  Zˆ, (28)
which implies that if the amount of pollution permits is constant, wˆL  rˆ holds.
Substituting (28) into (25), we have
Tˆ  θZT Zˆ + ξTMˆ. (29)
Substituting (29) into (27), we have8
qˆ + (τ − δTξT)Mˆ − δXXˆ  δT(pˆT + θZT Zˆ). (30)
Xˆ, Mˆ,qˆ, and wˆS are determined by (20), (23), (24), and (30). Rewrite (20), (23), (24), and (30) into the matrix form:
©­­­­­­­­­«
0 −ξX θKX θSX
λKX λKM − λKXξX −λKXθSXσX λKXθSXσX
1 −ξX θKXσX −θKXσX
−δX τ − δTξT 1 0
ª®®®®®®®®®¬
©­­­­­­­­­«
Xˆ
Mˆ
qˆ
wˆS
ª®®®®®®®®®¬

©­­­­­­­­­«
0
0
0
δT(pˆT + θZT Zˆ)
ª®®®®®®®®®¬
. (31)
We utilize (31) to analyze the effects of stricter environmental regulation and improvement in tourism terms-
of-trade.
3.1 Environmental regulation
First we analyze the effects of a stricter environmental regulation.
6Differentiating ξ j  g′j
M
g j
, we have
ξˆ j 
g′′j M
g′j
Mˆ + Mˆ − ξ jMˆ.
Dividing both sides by Mˆ yields
1 −  j  ξ j −
g′′j M
g′j
> 0.
7Note that since we consider only the effect of stricter environmental regulation (a decrease in Z), L is treated as constant.
8Note that pX is constant by the assumption of a small open economy.
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Solving (31), we obtain9
Xˆ
Zˆ
 −σXδTθZT(λKMθKX − λKXξX)
∆1
 −σXδTθZT(1 − δX)λKMθKX
∆1
< 0,
(32)
Mˆ
Zˆ

σXλKXδTθZT
∆1
> 0, (33)
qˆ
Zˆ

δTθZT(ξXλKXσX + θSXλKM)
∆1
> 0, (34)
wˆS
Zˆ

δTθZT(ξXλKXσX − θKXλKM)
∆1

δTθZTθKXλKM(δXσX − 1)
∆1
,
(35)
where
∆1  λKM(θSX + δXθKXσX) + λKXσX(τ − δTξT − δXξX + ξX) > 0. (36)
The second term is positive since
τ − δXξX − δTξT  δX(1 − X) + δT(1 − T) − δXξX − δTξT
 δX(ξX −
g′′XM
g′X
) + δT(ξT −
g′′TM
g′T
) − δXξX − δTξT
 −δX
g′′XM
g′X
− δT
g′′TM
g′T
> 0.
From (29), we have
Tˆ
Zˆ
 θZT + ξT
Mˆ
Zˆ
> 0.
Next, we consider the effects of the change in tourism terms-of-trade. When pT is constant, (21) implies
wˆL  θZT(wˆL − rˆ) + ξTMˆ.
Substituting (28) into the above equation, we obtain
wˆL
Zˆ

θZT
σT
+ ξT
Mˆ
Zˆ
> 0. (37)
9Using δX  ξXpXX/pMM, we have ξX  δX pMMpXX  δX
θKXλKM
λKX
.
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From (28), we have
rˆ
Zˆ

wˆL
Zˆ
− 1
σT

θZT
σT
+ ξT
Mˆ
Zˆ
− 1
σT
 −θLT
σT
+ ξT
σXλKXδTθZT
∆1

ξTσXλKXδTθZTσT − θLT∆1
σT∆1
< 0 if and only if σT < σ∗T ≡
θLT∆1
ξTλKXσXδTθZT
.
The above results are summarized by Table 3.1.
Xˆ Tˆ Mˆ wˆS wˆL qˆ rˆ
Z ↓ + − − ±a − − ±b
a: negative if σX > 1/δX , and positive if σX < 1/δX .
b: positive if σT < σ∗T , and negative if σ > σ
∗
T .
Table 1: Effects of stricter environmental regulation
Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the tourism terms-of-trade pT is constant. A stricter environmental regulation contracts
tourism sector and tourism infrastructure sector while it expands manufacturing sector. It decreases the wage of unskilled
labor and the rental rate of capital. If the elasticity of substitution in the manufacturing sector is small (large), the wage of
skilled labor rises (falls). If the elasticity of substitution in the tourism sector is small (large), the price of emission permits
rises (falls).
An economic intuition of the above results are as follows. Stricter environmental regulation decreases total
income (RZ  r > 0). Given the tax rate t, tax revenue declines, leading to decrease in the output of public
infrastructureM. Therefore, stricter environmental regulation lowers the output of tourism service and thewage
of unskilled labor which is a specific factor to tourism service. There are conflicting effects on the output of trade
good. On the one hand, inflow of capital from public infrastructure sector expands traded good sector. On the
other hand, contraction of public infrastructure sector decreases productivity of traded good sector. The former
effect outweighs the latter since the public infrastructure has diminishing effect on the tourism sector (see the
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third condition of (1)). When the elasticity of substitution in the trade good sector is large (small), inflow of
capital decreases (increases) demand for skilled labor and the wage of skilled labor. The rental rate of capital falls
due to decreased demand for capital in public infrastructure sector. If the elasticity of substitution in tourism
sector is small (large), decreased emission permits increases (decreases) the demand for emission permits and
its price.
We next consider the effect on relative wage or wage gap between skilled labor and unskilled labor. From
(33), (35), and (37), the change in wage gap is given by
wˆS
Zˆ
− wˆL
Zˆ

δTθZT(ξXλKXσX − θKXλKM)
∆1
− θZT
σT
− ξT Mˆ
Zˆ

δTθZT(ξXλKXσX − θKXλKM)
∆1
− θZT
σT
− ξT σXλKXδTθZT
∆1

(ξX − ξT)δTθZTλKXσX − δTθZTθKXλKM
∆1
− θZT
σT
.
Thus wˆS/Zˆ − wˆL/Zˆ < 0 if ξT ≥ ξX . Taking into account that wˆL/Zˆ is always positive and wˆS/Zˆ < 0 if and only if
σX < 1/δX , wˆS/Zˆ − wˆL/Zˆ < 0 if σX < 1/δX . It follows that wˆS/Zˆ − wˆL/Zˆ < 0 if ξT ≥ ξX or σX < 1/δX . We then
have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the tourism terms-of-trade pT is constant. If ξT ≥ ξX or σX < 1/δX , stricter environmental
regulation widens domestic wage inequality.
If ξT is sufficiently large, decrease in unskilled wage due to decreased tourism infrastructure is large. Therefore,
even if skilled wage decreases, decrease in unskilled wage is larger than that of skilled wage.
3.2 Improvement in tourism terms-of-trade
Next we consider the effects of an improvement in tourism terms-of-trade (dpT > 0).
From (31), the effects of the change in pT on X,M, q, wS are proportional to the effects of the change in Z:
Xˆ
pˆT

1
θZT
Xˆ
Zˆ
,
Mˆ
pˆT

1
θZT
Mˆ
Zˆ
,
qˆ
pˆT

1
θZT
qˆ
Zˆ
,
wˆS
pˆT

1
θZT
wˆS
Zˆ
.
When Z is unchanged, (28) implies wˆL  rˆ. Then (25) implies Tˆ  ξTMˆ > 0. Also, from (21), we have
rˆ  pˆT + Tˆ > 0. (38)
The effects of improvement in tourism terms-of-trade are summarized by the following table.
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Xˆ Tˆ Mˆ wˆS wˆL qˆ rˆ
pT ↑ − + + ±a + + +
a: positive if σX > 1/δX , negative if σX < 1/δX
Table 2: Effects of an improvement in tourism terms-of-trade
Thus we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An improvement in the tourism terms-of-trade expands tourism sector and tourism infrastructure sector
while it contracts manufacturing sector. It raises the wage of unskilled labor, the rentala rate of capital, and the price of
emission permits. If the elasticity of substitution in the manufacturing sector is small (large), the wage of skilled labor falls
(rises).
An improvement in the tourism terms-of-trade pT raises national income (RT  T > 0). Given t, tax revenue
increases, leading to increase in the output of public infrastructure. It follows that the output of tourism service
and the wage of unskilled labor rise. There are conflicting effects on the output of traded good. On the one hand,
the expansion of public infrastructure sector extract capital from traded good sector. On the other hand, the
increase in public infrastructures enhances the productivity of trade good sector. The former effect dominates
the latter, the output of traded good declines. When the elasticity of substitution in the traded good sector
is large (small), outflow of capital increases (decreases) the demand for skilled labor and the wage of skilled
labor. The expansion of tourism service sector raises the price of emission permits while the increase in public
infrastructure pushes up the rental rate of capital.
4 The toral effect
4.1 Tourism terms-of-trade and welfare
The above sections have treated the tourism terms-of-trade pT as constant. However, pT is eventually determined
by the market equilibrium condition of the domestic tourism service. In this section, we consider the effects of
stricter environmental regulation, taking into account the pT is determined endogenously.
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To determine the price of tourism service, we need to introduce the demand side of the economy. Suppose
that both domestic residents and foreign tourists consume manufacturing good and domestic tourism service.
The demand side of the economy is represented by the expenditure function of domestic residents and the
demand function of foreign tourists. The expenditure function is defined as
E(pT , Z, u) ≡ min[pXCX + pTCT |u  CaXCbTZ−ρ],
where CX is the consumption of manufacturing good and CT the consumption of domestic tourism service by
domestic residents. u is the level of the utility. a and b are parameters and satisfy a + b  1. ρ ≥ 0 represents
the magnitude of disutility from pollution. Since the utility function is specified as the Cobb-Douglas form, the
expenditure function is derived as E  upaXp
b
TZ
ρ/(aabb). By the envelope theorem, we have ET ≡ ∂E/∂pT 
bE/pT  CT . The negatively sloped demand function implies ETT ≡ ∂2E/∂p2T < 0. EZ ≡ ∂E/∂Z > 0 denotes the
marginal environmental damage perceived by domestic residents and Eu ≡ ∂E/∂u > 0 the inverse of marginal
utility of income. ETZ ≡ ∂2E/∂Z∂pT  ∂CT/∂Z > 0 since domestic residents increase the compensated demand
as disutility from pollution rises.
The utility function of foreign tourists is given by u∗  DαXD
β
TZ
−γ, where α + β  1 and γ ≥ 0. Given the
budget Y∗ of foreign tourists, demand function for domestic tourism service is derived as DT  βY∗/pT .
The revenue function of the domestic residents is given by
R(pT , Z) ≡ max[pXX + pTT |KX + KM  K].
Applying the envelope theorem, we have RT ≡ ∂R/∂pT  T and RZ ≡ ∂R/∂Z  r.10 The positively sloped supply
function implies RTT ≡ ∂2R/∂p2T > 0. Note that RTZ ≡ ∂2R/∂Z∂pT  ∂T/∂Z > 0 from the above analysis.
The budget constraint of the economy is
E(pT , Z, u)  R(pT , Z), (39)
which requires that the total expenditure is equal to the total revenue.
The market clearing condition for tourism service is
ET(pT , Z, u) + DT(pT)  RT(pT , Z), (40)
10Since Lindahl pricing is assumed, the usual envelope theorem holds. See Okamoto (1985).
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where the left hand side denotes the demand for tourism service while the right hand side denotes its supply.
The above two equations determine pT and u. Differentiating (39) and (40), we obtain
−DT Eu
−ST ETu


dpT
du
 

−(EZ − r)
RTZ − ETZ
 dZ, (41)
where ST ≡ RTT − ETT − ∂DT∂pT > 0 represents the slope of the excess supply function of the tourism service. Let
∆∗ be the determinant of the 2 × 2 matrix on the LHS of (41). Then stability condition requires ∆∗ > 0.11 Solving
(41), we obtain
dpT
dZ
 −ETu(EZ − r) + Eu(RTZ − ETZ)
∆∗ , (42)
du
dZ
 −DT(RTZ − ETZ) + ST(EZ − r)
∆∗ . (43)
As pointed out by Beladi et al. (2009) and Yanase (2017), stricter environmental regulation affects the tourism
terms-of-trade and domestic welfare through two conventional channels. On the one hand, if a pollution
reduction decreases domestic excess supply of tourism service (RTZ − ETZ  ∂∂Z (RT − ET)  ∂∂Z (T − CT) > 0),
the price of tourism service rises. This positive terms-of-trade effect improves the domestic welfare. On the
other hand, if the marginal damage of pollution to domestic residents is large than the marginal cost of pollution
emission (EZ > r), the pollution reduction pushes up the real income of domestic residents. This positive income
effect raises the tourism terms-of-trade.
Since ETuEZ  EuETZ , we can rewrite the effect of stricter environmental regulation on tourism terms-of-trade
(42) as
dpT
dZ
 −
rEu
pT
(
pT
r
∂r
∂pT
− pTETuEu
)
∆∗ , (44)
where pTETu/Eu  b is the domestic resident’s marginal propensity to consume tourism service. Since the
elasticity of the price of emission permits with respect to tourism terms-of-trade ( pTr
∂r
∂pT
) is greater than unity
(see (38)), a decrease in emission permits unambiguously improves the tourism terms-of-trade. That is, stricter
environmental regulation unambiguously yields positive terms-of-trade effect.
Differentiating (39) and substituting (40), we obtain
Eudu  DTdpT − (EZ − r)dZ. (45)
11Let Ω ≡ ET + DT − T be the domestic excess demand for tourism service. From equations (39) and (40), we have dpT/dΩ  −Eu/∆∗.
Hence, stability of tourism service market requires ∆∗ > 0.
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It follows that a sufficient condition for stricter environmental regulation to improve domestic welfare is EZ > r.
4.2 Effects on outputs and factor prices
The total effect (including the change in tourism terms-of-trade) of stricter environmental regulation on the
output of manufacturing good is given by
dX
dZ

∂X
∂Z
+
∂X
∂pT
dpT
dZ
(46)
or
Z
X
dX
dZ

Z
X
∂X
∂Z
+
pT
X
∂X
∂pT
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
. (47)
The first term represents the direct effect of the environmental regulation while the second term the indirect
effect that works through the change in the tourism terms-of-trade.
From (31), we have ZX
∂X
∂Z  θZT
pT
X
∂X
∂pT
. Therefore, the total effect is rewritten as
Z
X
dX
dZ
 θZT
pT
X
∂X
∂pT
+
pT
X
∂X
∂pT
Z
pT
dpT
dZ

pT
X
∂X
∂pT
(
θZT +
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
)
.
Since ∂X/∂pT < 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for the pollution reduction to decrease the output of
traded good (dX/dZ > 0) is
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
< −θZT .
Similarly, the total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the output of public infrastructure is
Z
M
dM
dZ

pT
M
∂M
∂pT
(θZT + ZpT
dpT
dZ
). (48)
Since ∂M/∂pT > 0, stricter environmental regulation decreases the output of public infrastructure if and only if
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> −θZT .
The total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the wage of skilled labor is
Z
wS
dwS
dZ

pT
wS
∂wS
∂pT
(
θZT +
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
)
.
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If ∂wS/∂pT > (<)0 (i.e., σX > (<)1/δX), the necessary and sufficient condition for stricter environmental policy
to decrease the wage of unskilled labor is
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> (<) − θZT .
The total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the rental rate of capital is
Z
q
dq
dZ

pT
q
∂q
∂pT
(
θZT +
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
)
.
Since ∂q/∂pT > 0, the amount of pollution and the rental rate of capital move the same direction if and only if
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> −θZT .
The total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the output of tourism service is
Z
T
dT
dZ

Z
T
∂T
∂Z
+
pT
T
∂T
∂pT
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
.
Since ∂T/∂pT > 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for stricter environmental regulation to decrease the
output of tourism service is
dT
dZ
> 0 ↔ Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> −
Z
T
∂T
∂Z
pT
T
∂T
∂pT
 −θZT + ξT
∂M
∂Z
Z
M
ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −
θZT + ξTθZT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −θZT
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
≡ A.
It is straightforward to show that A < −θZT .
The total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the wage of unskilled labor is
Z
wL
dwL
dZ

Z
wL
∂wL
∂Z
+
pT
wL
∂wL
∂pT
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
.
Since ∂wL/∂pT > 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for stricter environmental regulation to decrease the
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wage of unskilled labor is
dwL
dZ
> 0 ↔ Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> −
Z
wL
∂wL
∂Z
pT
wL
∂wL
∂pT
 −
θZT
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂Z
Z
M
pT
r
∂r
∂pT
 −
θZT
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂Z
Z
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −
θZT
σT
+ ξTθZT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −θZT
1
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
≡ B.
It follows that σT R 1 ↔ B R −θZT .
The total effect of stricter environmental regulation on the price of emission permits is
Z
r
dr
dZ

Z
r
∂r
∂Z
+
pT
r
∂r
∂pT
Z
pT
dpT
dZ
.
Since ∂r/∂pT > 0, stricter environmental regulation decreases the price of emission permits if and only if
dr
dZ
> 0 ↔ Z
pT
dpT
dZ
> −
Z
r
∂r
∂Z
pT
r
∂r
∂pT
≡ C.
Since wˆL/pˆT  rˆ/pˆT and (wˆL − rˆ)/Zˆ  1/σT > 0, we have B < C.
C  −
Z
r
∂r
∂Z
pT
r
∂r
∂pT
 −−
θLT
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂Z
Z
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −
− θLTσT + ξTθZT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 −θZT
− θLTθZTσT + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
.
It is straightforward to show that C > −θZT .
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We can show that B > A if σT ≥ 1/2:
B − A  −θZT
1
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
+ θZT
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
 θZT
(
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
−
1
σT
+ ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
)
 θZT
(
1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
)2 − ξT ∂M∂pT pTM ( 1σT + ξT ∂M∂pT pTM )
(ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M )(1 + ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M )
≥ 0 if σT > 1/2,
since the numerator is (
1 + ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
)2
− ξT ∂M∂pT
pT
M
(
1
σT
+ ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
)
 1 + 2ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
+
(
ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
)2
− ξT
σT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
−
(
ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
)2
 1 +
(
2 − 1
σT
)
ξT
∂M
∂pT
pT
M
> 0 if σT > 1/2.
Therefore, if σT > 1, A < −θZT < B < C. While if 1/2 < σT < 1, A < B < −θZT < C. The above results are
summarized by Table 3 - 6 and Proposition 3.
Z
pT
dpT
dZ ・・・ A ・・・ −θZT ・・・ B ・・・ C ・・・
dX/dZ + + + 0 − − − − −
dT/dZ − 0 + + + + + + +
dM/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dwS/dZ + + + 0 − − − − −
dwL/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dq/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dr/dZ − − − − − − − 0 +
Table 3: σT > 1 and σX < 1/δX
Proposition 3 A stricter environmental regulation expands the tourism sector if and only if pˆT/Zˆ < A. When σX < 1/δX ,
stricter environmental regulation narrows domestic wage inequality if ZpZ
dpT
dZ < min(−θZT , B), or widens domestic wage
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Z
pT
dpT
dZ ・・・ A ・・・ −θZT ・・・ B ・・・ C ・・・
dX/dZ + + + 0 − − − − −
dT/dZ − 0 + + + + + + +
dM/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dwS/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dwL/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dq/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dr/dZ − − − − − − − 0 +
Table 4: σT > 1 and σX > 1/δX
inequality if ZpZ
dpT
dZ > max(−θZT , B). When σX > 1/δX , stricter environmental regulation narrows domestic wage
inequality if ZpZ
dpT
dZ ∈ (−θZT , B) and σT > 1, or widens domestic wage inequality if ZpZ
dpT
dZ ∈ (B,−θZT) and σT < 1.
A stricter environmental regulation expands the tourism sector if and only if pˆT/Zˆ < A, i.e., positive terms-
of-trade effect is sufficiently large.
Next we consider the effect on skilled-unskilled wage gap. When σX < 1/δX (i.e., ∂wS/∂pT < 0), both the
direct and indirect effects work the opposite direction for the skilled wage and the unskilled wage. In this case,
if the terms-of-trade effect is sufficiently large, stricter environmental regulation leads to lower skilled wage
and higher unskilled wage, narrowing domestic wage inequality. While if the tourism terms-of-trade effects is
sufficiently small, stricter environmental regulation widens domestic wage gap (see Tables 3 and 5).
When σX > 1/δX (i.e., ∂wS/∂pT > 0), both the direct and indirect effects work to the same direction for the
skilled wage and the unskilled wage. In this case, if the terms-of-trade effect is moderate, the total effects on the
skilled wage and unskilled wage work to the opposite direction (see Table 4). If σT > 1, stricter environmental
regulation narrows domestic wage inequality. While if 1/2 ≤ σT < 1, stricter environmental policy leads to
widening domestic wage inequality (see Table 6).
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Z
pT
dpT
dZ ・・・ A ・・・ B ・・・ −θZT ・・・ C ・・・
dX/dZ + + + + + 0 − − −
dT/dZ − 0 + + + + + + +
dM/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dwS/dZ + + + + + 0 − − −
dwL/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dq/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dr/dZ − − − − − − − 0 +
Table 5: 1/2 ≤ σT < 1 and σX < 1/δX
5 Conclusions
This paper constructs a polluted small open economymodel with tourism and public infrastructure. Pollution is
emitted by the tourism sector. By reducing the amount of pollution, a stricter environmental regulation expands
the tourism sector if and only if the tourism terms-of-trade is large. In addition, the stricter environmental
regulation can narrow or widen the domestic wage inequality, depending on the elasticity of substitution in
the tourism and manufacturing sectors. When the elasticity of substitution in the manufacturing sector is
small, stricter environmental regulation narrows (widens) domestic wage inequality for a large (small) terms
of trade effect. When the elasticity of substitution in the manufacturing sector is large, stricter environmental
regulation narrows or widens domestic wage gap for moderate terms-of-trade effect, depending on the elasticity
of substitution in the tourism sector.
In this paper, we have considered that the public infrastructure is the creation of atmosphere type that has
no congestion effect. However, some infrastructure, such as highway, park, airport has congestion effect. This
type of public infrastructure is called the unpaid factor type, or semi public intermediate good. The analysis of
unpaid factor type of public infrastructure is one of the topics for future research.
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Z
pT
dpT
dZ ・・・ A ・・・ B ・・・ −θZT ・・・ C ・・・
dX/dZ + + + + + 0 − − −
dT/dZ − 0 + + + + + + +
dM/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dwS/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dwL/dZ − − − 0 + + + + +
dq/dZ − − − − − 0 + + +
dr/dZ − − − − − − − 0 +
Table 6: 1/2 ≤ σT < 1 and σX > 1/δX
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